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NOTE
The Legal Liability of Blood Donor Services and Transfusion Providers in
the Wake of the AIDS Crisis
I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 1982, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported
the first possible case of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
transmitted exclusively through a blood transfusion.' Subsequent to this
announcement, in January 1983, the American Red Cross, the American
Association of Blood Banks, and the Council of Community Blood Cen-
ters released the Joint Statement on AIDS Related to Transfusion. 2 This
statement recommended measures to limit and prevent the spread of
AIDS through blood transfusions and blood products.' In an effort to
determine whether donors had been exposed to AIDS or suffered from
any of the symptoms associated with AIDS and to protect the blood sup-
ply, the statement recommended a predonative screening of potential
blood donors and also suggested that members of the high-risk groups
for AIDS - homosexual men, intravenous drug users, Haitian immi-
grants and hemophiliacs - refrain from donating blood.4 In that same
year, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved these recom-
mendations and released several additional predonative guidelines.5 By
the summer of 1983, most blood centers were acting in accordance with
the predonative screening measures issued in the joint statement and by
1. David Stevens, Negligence Liability for Transfusion - Associated AIDS Transmission: An
Update and Proposal, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 221, 222 (1991). AIDS is a viral disease which attacks the
human immune system leaving its host vulnerable to opportunistic infections. The CDC has pub-
lished monthly AIDS statistics since the virus's discovery in 1981.
2. Id.
3. Id. The Joint Statement on AIDS Related to Transfusion recommended that hospitals
make autologous transfusions more available to those persons who were to undergo elective sur-
geries. Moreover, the statement recommended that potential blood donors be more carefully
screened for the symptoms of AIDS. However, these recommendations did not include any medical
laboratory blood screening based on sexual orientation. See infra note 77 and Kozup v. Georgetown
Univ. for these guidelines and other guidelines established by the statement.
4. Warren R. Janowitz, Safety of the Blood Supply: Liability for Transfusion-Associated AIDS,
9 J. LEGAL MED. 611, 612-13 (1988). These high-risk groups, excluding Haitians, were at high risk
for the development of blood-borne illnesses and viruses. The occurrence of AIDS in these groups
led to the belief that AIDS could be transmitted through whole-blood or whole-blood component
transfusions and blood products from source plasma.
5. Stevens, supra note 1, at 222. For a detailed discussion of these guidelines see FDA, Rec-
ommendations to Decrease the Risk of Transmitting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) from Blood Donors (Mar. 24, 1983).
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the FDA, and in 1984, the medical community confirmed that AIDS
could indeed be transmitted through blood and blood products.6 In
1984, the cause of AIDS, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), was
isolated and documented. 7 Subsequent to these determinations and
guidelines, blood banks, healthcare facilities, and physicians were con-
fronted with both the fight against AIDS and the question of how to best
assist those persons afflicted with this disease, as well as the onset of
litigation against those entities deemed responsible for the AIDS-related
blood transfusion injuries.8
Most of the litigation surrounding transfusion-related liability has been
brought by persons who contracted HIV from transfusions prior to
March 1985.9 On March 2, 1985, the FDA licensed the first HIV an-
tibody screening test, the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
test. t° Since that time, blood banks, healthcare facilities, and physicians
have screened potential donors' blood for the presence of HIV antibo-
dies. The ELISA test detects 96-98% of all possible HIV-infected blood
samples, but this test is problematic because its high degree of sensitivity
sometimes results in false seropositive interpretations." Another HIV
antibody screening test currently in use is the Western Blot test which is
even more sensitive and confirms or refutes the positive results of the
ELISA test. 2 However, neither test can detect HIV antibodies during
the six-week to eight-week window period when no antibodies are pres-
ent.' 3 Consequently, because blood has a shelf-life of only thirty-five to
forty-two days, the HIV-infected blood may be transfused to another per-
son, resulting in the subsequent development of AIDS in the recipient
before the donor's HIV status can even be determined.14 This window
period of uncertainty, compounded by the fact that neither the ELISA
test nor the Western Blot test is foolproof, raises concerns associated
with the safety of the nation's blood supply.' 5
The CDC estimates that 29,000 persons received blood transfusions
6. Stevens, supra note i, at 222.
7. Id. See Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 JAMA 247 (1985).
8. Stevens, supra note 1, at 222-23.
9. Id. at 223.
10. Id.; Karen S. Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (1986). On March 2, 1985, Margaret M. Heck-
ler, then the Secretary of Health and Human Services, announced that Abbott Laboratories of North
Chicago had been given the first license to manufacture the HIV antibody screening tests.
11. Linda J. Anderson, The AIDS Crisis and the Medical-Legal Implications of Transfusion
Therapy, 18 ANNA J. 291, 292 (1991).
12. Id. Although the Western Blot test is extremely sensitive, it too is unable to detect the
presence of HIV antibodies during the window-phase of the virus. After the HIV antibodies are
present in the blood, the ELISA test is 98% effective in the detection of AIDS, and when the ELISA
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with units of HIV-infected blood between 1978 and 1984,16 before HIV
antibody screening tests were readily available, yet currently there have
been only 4,659 cases (2%) of AIDS attributed to this mode of transmis-
sion.'1 The CDC further estimates that 12,000 of the 29,000 HIV-in-
fected recipients were still alive in 1987.18 A 1987 New England Journal
of Medicine article suggests that even with the ELISA and Western Blot
screening tests, one in every 250,000 units of blood is infected with HIV
despite a seronegative result. 9 These estimates indicate the unlikelihood
of the blood supply ever being completely safe from AIDS, and, as a
result, unless a cure or vaccination for AIDS becomes available, litiga-
tion concerning transfusion-related AIDS will continue to ensue.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the status of law regarding
blood transfusion liability and to examine public policy concerns for
holding blood banks, healthcare facilities, and physicians liable for the
transmission of HIV through blood transfusions. This essay only ad-
dresses the liability of blood banks, hospitals, and healthcare profession-
als who provide whole-blood and whole-blood component transfusions.
The legal liability of pharmaceutical companies which manufacture
blood products from source plasma may be different and is not discussed
in this essay.
II. LEGAL BASES OF RECOVERY FOR
TRANSFUSION-ASSOCIATED AIDS
The majority of litigation surrounding the liability of blood banks,
healthcare facilities, and physicians, initiated by persons injured as a re-
sult of blood transfusions of whole-blood or whole-blood components,
has been grounded in tort law.2° Tort actions such as negligence and
strict liability have been asserted by those persons injured through blood
transfusions to recover for their injuries. Another claim of a contractual
and commercial nature, a breach of an implied warranty, has also been
asserted in this same vein. In this essay, the status of the law with re-
spect to blood transfusion injuries and the ethical and public policy con-
cerns surrounding each of the following causes of action will be
discussed: implied warranty, strict liability, and negligence.
16. Stevens, supra note 1, at 223.
17. Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, 9 (July 1992).
18. Stevens, supra note 1, at 223.
19. Janowitz, supra note 4, at 614. For the journal article containing this estimate and other
related commentary on the accuracy of the ELISA and Western Blot tests, See Bove, Transfusion
Associated Hepatitis and AIDS, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 242 (1987).
20. Lipton, supra note 10, at 132.
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A. Implied Warranty
In order to determine what specific cause of action can be asserted by a
plaintiff seeking to recover for a transfusion-related injury, one must first
determine if a contractual relationship for the sale of a good existed be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. 2' To establish a contractual rela-
tionship, the courts were forced to determine whether blood banks,
healthcare facilities, and physicians were providing products for sale or
services for their patients.22 If the court characterized the activity of a
blood bank, healthcare facility, or physician as a sale of a product, then
the normal contractual principles governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) would apply. Thus, the seller of a product, according to
U.C.C. section 2-315, impliedly warrants that the goods are of merchant-
able quality and are fit for the particular purpose for which they are
used.2 3 However, if the court determines that a blood transfusion is a
service, rather than a product, then the plaintiff cannot recover under an
implied warranty, but may be entitled to recovery based upon a tort
claim.24
The seminal case in the area of a breach of an implied warranty of
fitness is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.25  In Perlmutter, the patient
plaintiff was infected with hepatitis as a result of a blood transfusion.
26
The New York Court of Appeals denied recovery to the plaintiff assert-
ing an implied warranty of fitness claim by determining that a blood
transfusion was a service and not the sale of a product. 27  The court
found that an implied warranty only applies to products; thus, an implied
warranty cause of action could not be maintained in this case.28 Further-
more, in reaching its decision, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned
that to hold a blood bank, hospital, or physician liable would not be in
the best interest of society because those organizations which supply
medical aid cannot act as an insurer in every case in which there is a
problem with a blood transfusion. 29 The Perlmutter court stated further
public policy considerations when it found that
[I]f the transaction were to be deemed a sale, liability would attach
21. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
22. Id. at 793.
23. Id. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1988). The complete text of section 2-315 is as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
24. Lipton, supra note 10, at 133-35.
25. 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
26. Id. at 793.
27. Id. at 794.
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irrespective of negligence or other fault. The art of healing frequently
calls for a balancing of risk and dangers to a patient. Consequently, if
injury results from the course adopted, where no negligence or fault is
present, liability should not be imposed upon the institution or agency
actually seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient.
30
The court in Perlmutter clearly based its decision on the equitable and
societal concerns of holding those entities who are in the business of sup-
plying a service or a good to the public necessary to save someone's life
or expedite the human healing process liable for transfusion-associated
injuries. 3' Although the Perlmutter court was concerned with hepatitis
contracted through a blood transfusion, the court in Roberts v. Suburban
Hospital Association addressed the issue of the transmission of AIDS
through a blood transfusion prior to the enactment of a blood shield stat-
ute and followed the public policy considerations of Perlmutter3' as did
other courts.33
In Roberts the court found, in addition to the fact that a blood transfu-
sion is a service and not a product, that a hospital is not liable to a pa-
tient for a blood transfusion which exposes and directly causes a patient
to subsequently contract the AIDS virus.34 The court determined that if
blood is contaminated with an infectious virus, then that blood is unfit or
unmarketable; whether the virus is AIDS or hepatitis is irrelevant.35
However, the court further stated that regardless of this finding, the leg-
islature has determined, based upon public policy concerns, that hospi-
tals and blood banks should be immune from liability with respect to
blood transfusions, whether the claim is based upon strict liability or an
implied warranty.36 The immunity of which the Roberts court speaks
stems from the promulgation of blood shield statutes.
B. Blood Shield Statutes
After the Perlmutter decision, some courts were reluctant to declare
that a blood transfusion was a service rather than a product.37 In Cun-
ningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, the court found that while the
function of a blood bank is to obtain blood from donors for distribution
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 532 A.2d 1081 (Md. App. 1987).
33. See, e.g., Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975) (rejecting the notion that a
hospital could be held liable for transfusion-related injuries on a theory of strict liability).
34. 532 A.2d at 1089 (Md. App. 1987).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970); Commu-
nity Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (finding that the appellate court had
erred in failing to find that the measurement of damages in an action for the breach of warranties of
merchantability was a question of fact).
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and the function of a hospital is to transfuse blood as an ancillary func-
tion to medical treatment, "both entities are clearly within the distribu-
tion chain of the products involved."38 Based upon this decision and
others, a split of authority existed among jurisdictions concerning
whether to allow recovery under implied warranty and strict liability the-
ories.39 Furthermore, a split also existed concerning from whom - the
blood bank, hospital, or physician - recovery could be sought.' As a
direct result of the public policy decisions of Perlmutter and the other
cases which followed its ruling and the pressure imposed by the medical
community and blood bank organizations, the majority of legislatures
have promulgated blood shield statutes.4" Blood shield statutes act to
bar a plaintiff's recovery under theories of implied warranty and strict
liability from blood banks, hospitals, or physicians by stating that the
supplying of blood for a transfusion is a service, rather than a product, or
by limiting recovery for these causes of action.42 Forty-nine of the fifty
38. 266 N.E.2d at 901.
39. Janowitz, supra note 4, at 617.
40. Id.
41. Stevens, supra note 1, at 225. Blood shield statutes have been adopted in every state, except
New Jersey, to insulate those entities which provide whole-blood or whole-blood component transfu-
sions. These statutes were enacted to disallow recoveries by injured parties based on claims of prod-
uct liability, implied warranties, and strict liability usually by stating that providing a blood
transfusion is a service and not a product. Most of these statutes were promulgated prior to the
AIDS epidemic to curtail the problem of hepatitis transfusion-related injuries; the remainder were
enacted in response to the AIDS crisis. Moreover, the majority of states and the District of Colum-
bia have disallowed recoveries in product liability, implied warranties, and strict liability claims. In
Vermont, however, the supreme court has not entertained the question. For the complete text of
each blood shield statute, see ALA. CODE § 7-2-314 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1989);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1481, 36-1151 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-802 (1987); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-280 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 672.316(5) (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1105 (1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-91
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1112, 5 5102 (1990); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-7-2 (West 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142A.8 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701
(1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2797 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (West Supp. 1989); MD.
HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106 § 2-316(5)
(West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(2) (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.928 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431-069
(Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 to 104 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001
(1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-10-5 (1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 580(4) (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-410 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3)(d) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2108.11
(Baldwin 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2151 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1989); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10021 (Purdon 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-30 (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 77.001-003 (Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-108 (1990);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32-1-297 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (Supp. 1990); W. VA.
CODE § 16-23-1 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31(2) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-5-110 (1990).
42. Id.
6
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states have adopted, in some form, a blood shield statute.43 North Caro-
lina's blood shield statute is representative of the majority of the blood
shield statutes." In North Carolina, blood donor services or the entities
providing blood transfusions cannot be held liable under the theories of
implied warranty of merchantability, implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, or strict liability, but these entities may be held liable
in negligence if such can be established.45 The other statutes found in a
minority of jurisdictions allow recovery only in the tort actions of negli-
gence and strict liability, but not under an implied warranty theory. 6
Even in New Jersey, the only state without a blood shield statute, the
courts have discussed the liability of organizations and entities which
provide blood transfusion services and have denied recovery to the in-
jured plaintiffs in those cases based upon the public policy considerations
as stated in the Perlmutter decision.47 Although the wording of the
blood shield statutes in each jurisdiction is different and each statute
should be examined individually to determine its scope and applicability,
the statutes have been quite effective in limiting plaintiffs' recovery.
C. Strict Liability
Strict liability in tort is another cause of action asserted by plaintiffs
seeking to recover for injuries and damages sustained from blood transfu-
sions. With strict liability, neither a contractual relationship nor any
fault on the part of the blood bank, healthcare facility, or provider is a
prerequisite for recovery.4" However, in order for a plaintiff to succeed
43. Id.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-410 (1989). The complete text of section 130A-410 is as follows:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products,
blood derivatives and other human tissue such as corneas, bones or organs for the purpose of
injecting, transfusing or transplanting any of them into the human body is declared to be, for all
purposes, the rendition of a service by every participating person or institution. Whether or not
any remuneration is paid, the service is declared not to be a sale of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, blood derivatives or other human tissue, for any purpose. No person or institution
shall be liable in warranty, express or implied, for the procurement, processing, distribution or
use of these items but nothing in this section shall alter or restrict the liability of a person or
institution in negligence or tort in consequence of these services.
45. Lipton, supra note 10, at 135.
46. Id. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797
(West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(2) (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 431-069 (Vernon Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Baldwin 1990); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, § 2151 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-
op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); VA. CODE ANN. § 32-1-297 (1985); and W. VA.
CODE § 16-23-1 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Magrine v. Kransnich, 227 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. 1967); Johnson v. Mahlenberg
Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. 1967).
48. Howell v. Spokane and Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990). The
Washington Supreme Court made this statement concerning strict liability; however, the court still
found that the transfusion of blood was a service and not a product, thus precluding liability based
upon strict liability.
7
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in an action for strict liability, the court must determine whether the
jurisdiction allows such an action and, as with an implied warranty,
whether a blood transfusion is a service or a product.4 9 A strict liability
claim is actionable only as to a defective and unreasonably dangerous
product.'5 Thus, a plaintiff must meet this higher burden in order to
recover damages.
The court in Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, one of the
first cases that discussed strict liability in blood transfusion cases, found
that a blood transfusion is a product and not a service and allowed a
plaintiff who contracted hepatitis from a blood transfusion to recover her
damages based upon a theory of strict liability.51 The court, in making
its finding, cited the language of section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, which provides that an entity which sells a good or product in an
unreasonably dangerous and defective condition is liable to the user or
consumer for physical harm to his person or property even if fault on the
part of the defendant entity cannot be proven.5 2  In Cunningham, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the hospital and the blood bank pro-
vided an unreasonably dangerous and defective product and that both
organizations were a part of a "distribution chain" in which this product
was involved."s After this ruling, the Illinois legislature and courts
quickly and unequivocally overruled the Cunningham decision.5 4
Prior to the enactment of the blood shield statutes, the majority of
courts extended the Perlmutter decision concerning an implied warranty
cause of action to those cases in which a strict liability cause of action
was asserted.55 Following the Perlmutter line of reasoning, a Washing-
ton Supreme Court in Howell v. Spokane and Inland Empire Blood Bank,
refused to hold a blood bank and hospital liable when a plaintiff patient
contracted AIDS from HIV-tainted blood during a transfusion.56
Although Washington's blood shield statute bars actions based upon im-
plied warranty and strict liability, the court found that the statute was
not retroactive to the time period in which this patient's exposure took
place, October 1984."7 Here, the court denied recovery in strict liability
based upon public policy concerns.58 The court stated that the public
needs an affordable, sufficient blood supply which warrants the distinc-
tion between those injured by a blood transfusion versus those injured by
49. Lipton, supra note 10, at 134.
50, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
51. 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
53. 266 N.E.2d at 901.
54. See Glass v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 336 N.E.2d 495 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
55. See, e.g., Kolnig v. Milwaukee Blood Ctr., Inc., 127 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964).
56. 785 P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990).
57. Id. at 822.
58. Id. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
1992] 209
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defective products.59 Furthermore, at the time of this patient's exposure,
no adequate method existed to screen the nation's blood supply for HIV
antibodies; thus, strict liability could not be used as a deterrent for the
prevention of future accidents of this nature.' The court also concluded
that notwithstanding the fact that providers of blood and blood transfu-
sions may be in the best position to absorb the cost of damages sustained
by transfusions, these costs would be levied on the consumer, and this
would not be in the public's best interest.61 Finally, although blood
banks charge a fee for blood, they are typically non-profit organizations
providing a necessary service to the public.
6 2
Similarly, in Kozup v. Georgetown University the District Court of the
District of Columbia held that a plaintiff who contracted AIDS through
a blood transfusion could not recover under strict liability.63 The Kozup
court, like the Perlmutter court, found that a blood transfusion is a ser-
vice and not a product." Furthermore, the court stated that the need for
an affordable, adequate blood supply outweighed the need of this injured
plaintiff to recover.65 In dicta, the court mentioned that the comment k,
"unavoidably unsafe product" exception, to section 402A of the Restate-
ment of Torts would be inapplicable even if a blood transfusion could be
found to be a product because of its impure nature, and that this excep-
tion applies only to products of a pure nature, such as drugs and vaccina-
tions.66 Presently, the ELISA and Western Blot tests have made the
blood supply much safer than it was in March 1985, which further weak-
ens the unavoidably unsafe product exception rationale in the case of
blood. Thus, under the current status of the law, in most cases a plaintiff
asserting a claim based upon strict liability would be unsuccessful.
D. Negligence
Because most courts have been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to recover
under theories of implied warranty and strict liability, a plaintiff who
contracts AIDS through a blood transfusion will most likely be success-
ful when asserting a negligence claim against a blood bank, healthcare
facility, or physician.67 During the 1980's, plaintiffs generally asserted
all three claims - implied warranty, strict liability, and negligence.6"




63. 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d
437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
64. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1059.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Janowitz, supra note 4, at 618.
68. Stevens, supra note 1, at 225.
9
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While the courts dismissed the implied warranty and strict liability
claims immediately, negligence claims usually survived summary judg-
ment motions. 69 However, in the 1980's the vast majority of these cases
were decided in favor of the defendant.7° While there was no major
award for negligence liability in the 1980's, when the 1990's began, the
potential for such an award existed.7"
A fundamental understanding of the elements of a negligence claim is
essential in determining whether such a claim can be maintained. A de-
fendant can be held liable under a theory of negligence by failing to act
reasonably in light of all foreseeable risks and accepted standards of prac-
tice at the time the blood donation or transfusion occurs.72 The four
essential elements required to assert a medical negligence claim are the
following: a legally recognized duty requiring the defendant to conform
to an accepted standard of conduct; a failure of the defendant to conform
to that accepted standard of conduct; a reasonably close and foreseeable
causal connection between the conduct of defendant and the actual in-
jury which results; and the suffering of actual harm by the plaintiff.73
In the past, the following three prominent negligence theories have
been asserted against blood banks: a failure by a blood bank to use surro-
gate testing to eliminate AIDS-contaminated blood from the nation's
blood supply before 1985 when HIV antibodies testing became readily
available; a failure of a blood bank to use the HIV antibody screening
tests once the test became available in March 1985; and a failure by a
blood bank to warn the donor of the risk of donating blood on subse-
quent occasions after discovering the HIV antibodies in the donated
blood units.74 Although no plaintiff has recovered damages based upon
the last theory of negligence, plaintiffs who have asserted either of the
other two theories have been successful.7" Additionally, the following
three negligence theories have been asserted by plaintiffs against hospitals
and physicians and have been occasionally successful: a claim based upon
a physician's negligent determination that the plaintiff needed a blood
transfusion; a claim based upon a physician's negligent medical treat-
ment which created the need for the blood transfusion that caused the
plaintiff's injury; and a claim based upon a physician's failure to inform
the plaintiff of the risks associated with a blood transfusion, or a failure
to advise the plaintiff about the possibility of a directed donation in
which the blood is donated by a source chosen by the patient, or of an
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 226.
72. Id.
73. Janowitz, supra note 4, at 619.
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autologous blood donation in which blood is drawn from the patient
prior to the surgery.76
The seminal case concerning the negligent transfusion of blood epito-
mizing the 1980's trend not to hold blood banks, hospitals, and physi-
cians liable for blood transfusions administered before March 1983, when
the medical community was unaware that AIDS could be transmitted by
blood, was Kozup v. Georgetown University." In January 1983, at Ge-
orgetown University Hospital, a premature infant received a blood trans-
fusion of AIDS-contaminated blood supplied by the American Red
Cross.7" After the infant contracted AIDS from the blood transfusion
and died in 1986, the infant's parents brought a negligence claim against
the hospital and the American Red Cross, stating that the hospital
breached its duty of care by failing to take preventative measures to pro-
tect the infant from contracting AIDS, and alleging that the American
Red Cross breached its duty of care to provide a sufficient and safe blood
supply.7 9 The court found that the care given to the infant was consis-
tent with the prevailing professional standard of care, given the medical
and scientific uncertainty at the time the blood was transfused."0 In the
1980's the majority of courts held this view."'
However, in the 1990's, some federal courts began to allow plaintiffs to
recover for these AIDS-related injuries sustained from blood transfu-
sions.8 2 Furthermore, in some cases, especially those cases after March
1985, in which HIV antibody tests were available, but the blood units
were not tested before the blood was transfused, the American Red Cross
has settled prior to trial.8 3 Two cases in which district courts have al-
lowed substantial recoveries in negligent blood transfusion cases are
76. Id.
77. 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d
437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
78. 663 F. Supp. at 1050.
79. Id. at 1055.
80. Id. at 1058.
81. See, e.g., Hoemke v. New York Blood Ctr., 91f F.2d 550 (2nd Cir. 1990). The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the hospital did not breach a duty of care when the
hospital personnel failed to advise a patient who contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion dur-
ing a 1981 surgery of the option of an autologous or directed blood transfusion or by failing to
inform or train hospital employees on how or when to avoid transfusions in some circumstances.
Furthermore, the blood bank did not breach a duty of care when it failed to screen out gay male
blood donors and failed to screen the blood with an alanine aminotranferase test, a test which detects
hepatitis in the bloodstream. In Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989), the
court found that the blood bank's screening practices did not proximately cause the plaintiff to
contract AIDS. The blood bank personnel were trained to use the ELISA tests after the blood had
been transfused to the plaintiff.
82. Stevens, supra note 1, at 234.
83. Id. at 227.
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Gaffney v. United States"4 and Doe v. United States.85 Whether the appel-
late courts will uphold these awards is unclear, but the potential for re-
covery exists, especially in cases such as these two where gross medical
malpractice is involved.
In Gaffney, a man who contracted AIDS from his deceased wife sued
the United States on his own, as well as on his deceased wife and son's,
behalf 6 Gaffney's complaint alleged that as a result of a Massachusetts
naval hospital physician's negligent management of his wife's pregnancy,
his wife was required to undergo a blood transfusion with AIDS-contam-
inated blood.87 The court found the physician's conduct to be gross med-
ical malpractice and stated that even though the risk of contracting
AIDS through a blood transfusion was unknown in September 1981, the
risk of contracting transfusion-related illnesses such as hepatitis and
syphilis was a foreseeable consequence of a blood transfusion. 8 The
court stated that because the physician's negligent conduct was the prox-
imate cause of the injuries to the Gaffney family, the fact that the physi-
cian neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the consequence of
contracting AIDS through a blood transfusion would neither prevent his
liability nor the liability of the hospital.89
Similarly, in Doe v. United States, the Rhode Island District Court
followed the holding of the Gaffney court by stating that the plaintiff
must prove that his injury was a direct and foreseeable result of the de-
fendant's negligence. The Doe court stated that when the plaintiff's son
had a tonsillectomy in April 1983, there was clearly a foreseeable risk
that a patient could contract AIDS through a blood transfusion; thus,
the hospital should be held liable. 90
These results seem to indicate that courts are increasingly willing to
hold hospitals, blood banks, and physicians liable for the damages they
cause through AIDS-tainted blood transfusions. However, in reaching
these decisions, these courts battled with the public policy concerns of
two competing interests - the desire to protect the availability and in-
tegrity of the nation's blood supply versus the desire to compensate the
innocent victim for his injuries. Furthermore, when asserting a negli-
gence claim, the plaintiff faces many problems such as problems with
causation, problems with establishing the proper professional standard of
care, problems with establishing a negligent blood donor screening proce-
84. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5184 (D. Mass. 1990).
85. 737 F. Supp 155 (D.R.I. 1990).
86. Gaffney v. United States, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5184 (D. Mass. 1990) at *5 (asterisk
indicates Lexis pagination).
87. Id.
88. Id. at *20.
89. Id.
90. 737 F. Supp. at 161-62.
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dure case because the court will not allow discovery of the donor's iden-
tity, problems in determining when the statute of limitations begins to
accrue, and problems in determining which court should hear the plain-
tiff's cause of action.
1. Standard of Care Problems
When a plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against a blood bank,
healthcare facility, or physician for an injury associated with a blood
transfusion, the plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove that the defend-
ant failed to act reasonably in light of all foreseeable risks and accepted
standards of practice at the time the blood donation or transfusion oc-
curred.9" A blood bank, healthcare facility, and physician are often held
to the professional standard of care which is the same degree of care that
other blood banks and healthcare facilities and professionals would exer-
cise in similar situations.92 In Kozup, the District of Columbia District
Court held a hospital and a blood bank to the industry standard by
which all other blood-donating services and transfusion providers could
be measured in negligence cases.93 However, to establish the industry
standard of care for those entities providing blood transfusions, the plain-
tiff must deal with three different standards of care during three different
time periods associated with the AIDS crisis.94 These three time periods
are of critical importance and are also a major source of conflict for the
plaintiff trying to assert a negligence claim.
Before March 1983, conflicting information existed concerning
whether AIDS could be transmitted through the nation's blood supply,
and no blood donor screening guidelines or antibody screening tests were
available to detect donors who carried the AIDS virus or those units of
AIDS-tainted blood.95 Therefore, a court is extremely unlikely to find
that a blood bank, hospital, or physician could have known of the risk of
AIDS, or should have known of the risk of AIDS and could have taken
precautions against its transmission through a blood transfusion.96
In regard to the second critical time period, from March 1983 to
March 1985, the court, when hearing blood transfusion cases, will be
concerned with various matters such as which of the FDA guidelines and
recommended procedures and practices were implemented and the speed
of their implementation. 97 In the majority of cases concerning negligent
blood transfusions prior to March 1985, the court will determine if any
91. Stevens, supra note 1, at 227.
92. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (D.C. 1987).
93. Id.
94. Lipton, supra note 10, at 143.
95. Id. at 144.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 145.
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negligent conduct existed in the performance of two common practices
associated with blood transfusions - the use of FDA-recommended
questionnaires and the use of surrogate tests to detect other viruses com-
monly found in AIDS patients' blood.98 It is unlikely that a negligence
claim could be proven in cases in which the screening of the donor oc-
curred prior to the initiation of HIV antibody screening tests, because the
courts, based on privacy and confidentiality rights, usually will not allow
the plaintiff to discover the name of the donor who donated the AIDS-
contaminated blood.99 This inability to question a valuable witness com-
pounded with the fact that donor questionnaires are highly dependent on
the cooperation and honesty of blood donors, makes a case of negligent
screening almost impossible for the plaintiff to prove.'I° Furthermore, a
negligent failure by a blood bank, healthcare facility, or physician to use
surrogate testing to detect AIDS in the blood would also be difficult to
establish. 10 Thus, this type of claim fails because even if a surrogate test
determines that there is an infectious virus in a blood unit, the test will
not confirm the presence of HIV antibodies, and none of the tests used
during this time period were licensed by the FDA to screen for the pres-
ence of HIV antibodies. 102 A defendant blood donor service or transfu-
sion provider usually only needs to show that the defendant adhered to
the FDA-recommended standards and the standards of the American
Association of Blood Banks. This will establish that there was no breach
of a duty of care to protect the nation's blood supply from the AIDS
virus. 1
0 3
Finally, when considering the blood which was collected after the HIV
antibody screening tests were routinely used, beginning in March 1985, a
plaintiff, when asserting a breach of a standard of care argument, should
base his negligence claim on the speed of the implementation of the
screening tests and/or the varying sensitivities and specificities of one
manufacturer's test versus that of another."° Although each of these
types of negligence cases will be fact-specific, the CDC has stated that all
blood banks, hospitals, and physicians quickly implemented the HIV an-
tibody screening tests as soon as these tests became available.0 5 Further-
more, the CDC indicated that once these tests were routinely used, then,
barring any negligent failure to screen blood, these blood donor and
transfusion services would operate with little risk of liability.' 6
98. Id.
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One of the earliest cases exemplifying the standard of care in the post-
HIV antibodies test era and which may be indicative of subsequent rul-
ings on this issue is Smythe v. American Red Cross Blood Services North-
eastern New York 107 In Smythe, the plaintiff was exposed to AIDS via a
blood transfusion which contained no HIV antibodies.108 The unit of
blood used in the plaintiff's transfusion was donated on April 30, 1986,
by a donor who recently had been exposed to the AIDS virus, but had
not yet developed HIV antibodies."t° The first unit of donated blood
tested negative, but when the same donor returned to donate blood again
almost two months later, his blood tested seropositive for the HIV an-
tibody. The plaintiff brought a malpractice cause of action against the
hospital and a negligence claim against the Red Cross stating that the
hospital was negligent in its administration of blood and failed to adhere
to accepted medical and surgical standards and that the blood bank was
negligent in its collection and distribution of blood."' l The plaintiff
claimed that the negligence of both of these entities was the direct and
proximate cause of her injuries.112 However, the defendants subse-
quently moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court granted the defendants'
motion. 113
The Smythe case is noteworthy because it provides a detailed discus-
sion of the facts surrounding the donation of blood and the appropriate
standard of care to be used by hospitals and blood banks in the post-HIV
antibodies test era in all cases. The general rule for the Red Cross and
other entities which voluntarily gather and distribute blood is that these
professionals and organizations are held to the prevailing standard of
care of their profession or industry." 4 However, if a profession or an
organization is lax in its adoption and administration of its procedures,
then the court can hold the defendant to a higher standard of care than
adopted and administered by the profession or industry."' The Red
Cross was a forerunner in its implementation of predonative, disease-pre-
ventative measures and properly and promptly made every effort to com-
ply with all guidelines to ensure the adequacy and safety of the nation's
107. Smythe v. American Red Cross Blood Serv. Northeastern N.Y., 797 F. Supp. 147
(N.D.N.Y. 1992).
108. Id. at 150.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 150-51.
111. Id. at 149.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 153. Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A party against
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at
any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as
to all or any part thereof."
114. Smythe, 797 F. Supp. at 152.
115. Id.
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blood supply. 1 16 In this case, the court found that the evidence was over-
whelming that the Red Cross followed all applicable FDA and American
Association of Blood Banks guidelines and adhered to all prevailing and
contemporary standards and practices of volunteer blood collecting
services. 
17
In Smythe, the donor was given a pamphlet discussing the most cur-
rent information concerning the donation of blood and the prevention of
diseases, including AIDS, orally instructed by a Red Cross employee to
read the pamphlet, and required to sign a statement verifying that he
read it. 118 Moreover, the donor was also required to answer twenty ques-
tions concerning his medical history and was given a physical by a Red
Cross nurse which included a hemoglobin test and an examination for
needle marks and skin lesions to determine if the donor may have been
exposed to AIDS. 19 Finally, the donated blood was tested for HIV an-
tibodies and other blood-borne illnesses.12 All these tests and imple-
mented procedures led the Red Cross to find no reasons for the donor's
blood to be rejected.121
As aforementioned, the ELISA and Western Blot test will detect most,
but not all, blood that contains the AIDS virus; consequently, blood
from a donor during the window-period of the virus will test seronegative
for the HIV antibody.' 22 Since there is no blood test to detect AIDS
before the HIV antibodies appear, the nation's blood supply will proba-
bly never be completely safe and reliable. Thus, as found in the Smythe
case, when hospitals and the Red Cross adhere to the prevailing standard
of care for their profession, summary judgment in favor of the defendants
may be granted and these entities which provide these services will be
protected from liability. The Smythe case may be indicative of how
other courts will rule and could deter this type of plaintiff from seeking
compensation for his or her transfusion-related injuries.
2. The Blood Donor's Right to Privacy and the Negligent
Screening of Donors Problem
Traditionally, the plaintiff has faced many difficulties in trying to per-
suade a court to compel the discovery of a donor's identity. In order for
a plaintiff to prove that the blood bank, healthcare facility, or physician
used negligent screening practices, the donor's testimony is often crucial.
However, once the donor's identity is discovered, his right to privacy is
116. Id.
117. Id.




122. Id. at 152-53. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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lost, and his HIV-positive status is revealed. Generally, the legal justifi-
cation for the donor's protection has been found within the protection
afforded by the physician/patient privilege and the constitutional right to
privacy.123 Although a discussion of the physician/patient privilege and
the constitutional right to privacy arguments are beyond the scope of this
essay, the request for compelled discovery of a donor's medical records is
becoming more frequent and is creating a major source of controversy
between two public policy concerns - the right of an individual to re-
cover his damages from an AIDS-contaminated blood transfusion and
the donor's right to his anonymity. A split of authority exists on this
issue with some courts finding that a donor's right to privacy and the
need for an adequate blood supply are far superior to the rights of plain-
tiffs seeking discovery.' 24 Other courts have allowed discovery of facts
and information concerning the donor's predonative screening evalua-
tion, but not his identity, 25 usually by using a veiled deposition de-
cree.126 At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have allowed the
total disclosure of the donor's identity and last known address. '27 Thus,
the question of whether the court will allow discovery of the donor's
identity so that the plaintiff can more easily prove a negligent blood do-
nor screening case varies among the jurisdictions, and an examination of
each jurisdiction's case law is necessary.
3. Statute of Limitations Problems
As with most medical negligence cases, the time the statute of limita-
123. Lipton, supra note 10, at 161.
124. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). The plaintiffs motion
to discover the names of fifty-one blood donors was deemed a fishing expedition by the court. This
type of discovery was felt by the court not to further the plaintiffs interest in compensation for his
injuries, but could, however, interfere in the personal lives of the donors and could hinder efforts to
maintain an adequate blood supply. The plaintiff here was injured when he was struck by a car while
sitting on a bench; he received fifty-one units of blood while hospitalized and died of AIDS two years
later. In Laburne v. East Jefferson General Hospital, 555 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1990), the plaintiff con-
tracted hepatitis via a blood transfusion. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that a donor's right to
privacy and the need for an adequate blood supply outweighed the plaintiffs need for the discovery
of the donor's name and address. The court stated that the discovery of the information on the
donor's cards and follow-up questionnaires would suffice, and the discovery of the donor's name and
address would be excessive.
125. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988) (al-
lowing the discovery of masked donor cards, but not the donor's identity or address).
126. See Doe. v. American Red Cross Blood Serv., 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989).
127. See Sampson v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 95 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (finding that the
right of privacy in transfusion-related injury cases is not absolute, but rather involves a weighing of
interests). In Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992), the court found that
the acceptance of the Red Cross's public policy arguments would lead to "blanket immunity from
donation-related injuries," and the donor is the person who is in the best position to recall any
negligence by the Red Cross in its screening process. Moreover, the court stated that the donor's
testimony is very important in proving the plaintiffs negligence claim. Thus, the discovery of the
donor's identity was allowed.
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tions begins to accrue is a perennial problem, especially with diseases
such as AIDS with long and varied incubation periods. A review of the
medical malpractice case law in each jurisdiction will be necessary to
determine whether the discovery rule is recognized in that jurisdiction
and to determine when a negligence claim will be barred because of the
running of the statute of limitations.
4. Procedural Problems
The issue of whether the American National Red Cross could sue or
be sued in federal court was a question which generated much litigation.
Currently, more than forty district courts have heard this question, but
no consensus of authority exists.' 2 ' The congressional charter of the
American National Red Cross authorizes the Red Cross "to sue and be
sued in courts of law and equity, State and Federal within the jurisdiction
of the United States." '29 The Supreme Court decided, in the case of
American National Red Cross v. S.G., that the "sue and be sued" provi-
sion grants the federal courts original jurisdiction over all cases in which
the Red Cross is a party to the action. 3' This provision, which specifi-
cally states that the federal court has original jurisdiction, was deemed by
the court to be an express authorization granting federal jurisdiction.'
The American National Red Cross case is a landmark decision because in
all subsequent cases in which the Red Cross is named as a defendant in a
state-law action, the Red Cross is authorized to remove a case from a
state court to a federal court pursuant to removal jurisdiction.'3 2 The
impact and repercussions of this decision are only speculative at this
point, but some potential consequences include an increase in the federal
district courts' docket and the selection of jurors from different localities
which may affect the finding of culpability on the part of the Red Cross
and the amount of damages awarded.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In considering whether blood banks, hospitals, and physicians can be
held liable to a plaintiff who contracted AIDS through an AIDS-tainted
blood transfusion, the legislatures and courts have pursued a common
goal - to protect the blood donor services and transfusion providers so
that both an adequate blood supply and safe, cost-efficient blood transfu-
sions will be available. Thus far, the trend appears to be that the courts
are reluctant to find the defendant blood bank, hospital, or physician lia-
128. American.Nat'! Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S.Ct. 2465, 2468 n.1 (1992).
129. 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
130. 112 S.Ct. at 2467.
131. Id. at 2472.
132. Id. at 2467; 28 U.S.C. 1441 (1988).
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ble based upon theories of implied warranty, strict liability, and negli-
gence. Even though the present risk of contracting AIDS through the
blood supply is less likely with the advent of both accurate and sensitive
HIV antibody screening tests, the legislatures, through the enactment of
the blood shield statutes, have determined that a supplier of a good or
service, such as blood, which greatly benefits the interest of society as a
whole should not be faced with the burden of defending an infinite
number of claims of damages and injuries resulting from blood transfu-
sions. The cost of litigation is rapidly increasing, and this, in addition to
the cost of potential awards against the defendant, would result in an
increase in the price of blood and blood transfusions, and could possibly
discourage blood banks and the medical industry from providing this
risky and costly service which a patient may need to survive. Thus, by
limiting the liability of blood banks, medical facilities, and physicians
stemming from transfusion-associated injuries, these entities will con-
tinue to provide a valuable public service.
While the legislatures have limited recoveries under an implied war-
ranty or a strict liability theory, the courts have made a negligence claim
increasingly difficult for a plaintiff, without expending large amounts of
money, time, and effort, to prove. The plaintiff must overcome many
hurdles in proving a negligence claim, such as finding the applicable stan-
dard of care when the transfusion occurred. Furthermore, because the
donor who donated the AIDS-tainted blood may be deceased, or the
court refuses to compel the discovery of his identity, a valuable and nec-
essary witness needed to prove a negligent donor screening case may be
unavailable. 3' Also, as aforementioned, the fact that AIDS remains
dormant and without any physical manifestations for an indefinite period
of time gives rise to a statute of limitations problem. For these reasons,
the plaintiff generally has been unable to recover under any theory, and
the legislatures' and courts' goal of maintaining an adequate blood sup-
ply has been realized. Donors are more apt to donate blood if their iden-
tity and HIV status remain undisclosed. Additionally, if blood bank
directors, hospital administrators, and physicians are confident that they
will not be sued, then aggressive measures on their part to collect and
transfuse blood will not be stifled.
However, these goals cannot be achieved without some costs. A chil-
ling effect will result, causing fewer plaintiffs to initiate claims against
blood collecting and transfusion-providing services if the plaintiff per-
ceives his claim to be futile. If these organizations and persons providing
these services are confident that they will be immune from any civil lia-
133. Jan M. Bennetts, AIDS; Blood Bank Liability, 27 WILLAMMETrE L. REV. 355, 362-65
(1991). This thoughtful comment provides a more detailed discussion of strict liability as a viable
option to provide compensation for those innocent victims of transfusion-related injuries.
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bility resulting from an AIDS-tainted blood supply, what incentive, other
than a moral one in protecting lives, would these entities have?'34 Would
those providing these services become complacent in their present AIDS-
preventive measures? How many people would have to die before the
legislatures and courts would feel compelled to react? Even though
blood transfusions are often necessary to save lives, how useful would
transfusions be if they only cured the immediate crises, but later sub-
jected a patient to the painful, deadly disease of AIDS? These public
policy and ethical questions need answers which the legislatures and
courts have failed to supply.
In considering these three main theories of recovery, would not a strict
liability claim be a viable option for the plaintiff who in the future is
exposed to the AIDS virus through a blood transfusion?' 35 Here the
plaintiff would not have to prove any negligence or fault on the part of
the defendant, and a donor witness would not be necessary in order to
prove a negligent donor screening case.' 3 6 Furthermore, because of the
HIV antibody screening tests, the blood'supply is much safer, and the
chance of contracting AIDS through a blood transfusion is much
lower. 37 Thus, these blood banks, hospitals, and physicians who are in a
much better position to absorb the cost of the injury, instead of the inno-
cent plaintiff who is fighting a deadly disease and paying medical ex-
penses, could bear the cost of an AIDS-tainted blood transfusion.'
38
Furthermore, holding blood banks, hospitals, and physicians liable with-
out fault would force them to operate a much safer organization or prac-
tice under the threat of civil litigation.' 39 Blood banks would have to
practice more stringent predonative measures, and a physician would be
more likely to inform his patients of the dangers of blood transfusions
and of the possibility of potentially safer alternatives such as directed or
autologous donations. The blood from these alternative sources could be
tested as well, and if that blood was not used during the surgery, then it
could be used in the general blood supply. With all these advantages, an
examination by the legislatures and courts of the possibility of allowing a
strict liability cause of action in regard to AIDS-related blood transfu-
sion injuries is warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
As litigation surrounding AIDS-contaminated blood transfusions con-
tinues, the need for an adequate and safe blood supply and an innocent
134. Id.
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victim's right to recover must be balanced in order to determine how the
public's interest can be served best. Because of the existing laws, such as
the blood shield statutes, and the obstacles involved in proving causation
in a medical malpractice case, the trend has been to protect the blood
supply in lieu of compensating those who have been injured and have
suffered. Only by the thoughtful considerations of the legislatures, the
courts, attorneys, and the public will the answers to these complicated
questions and problems be found.
JAMES W. MORGAN
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